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LABOR LAW-LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT-JURISDICTION OF
FEDERAL COURTS TO ENJOIN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES-Following a breakdown in negotiations over contract extension, plaintiff union, the certified representative of defendant's employees, sued in a federal district court, alleging that
defendant was guilty of an unfair labor practice under the Labor-Management
Relations Act 1 in refusing to bargain in good faith. An injunction was sought
requiring defendant to bargain with the union. The district court overruled

1

29 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1947) § 158.
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motions' to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and granted the relief requested, 2
On appeal, held, reversed. The district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the
suit. Amazon Cotton Mills Co. v. Textile Workers Union, (C.C.A. 4th,

1948) 167 F. (2d) 183.
The issue raised by the case turns principally upon the construction of section
10(a) of the L.M.R.A. 8 and its omission to state, as did the corresponding
section of the National Labor Relations Act 4 which it amends, that the board's
jurisdiction in preventing unfair labor practices shall be exclusive. Relying on
this omission, together with section 301 (b) of the new act conferring on unions
capacity to sue in federal courts, the trial court held that private parties might
now sue to enjoin these unfair practices without applying to the board. Unquestionably, the N.L.R.A. did not allow this.5 As the appellate court points out,
it seems clear that the change in section lo (a) was not intended to vest the
federal courts with general jurisdiction over unfair practices, but merely• to
recognize the jurisdiction specifically conferred on the courts by other sections
of the L.M.R.A. 6 In explaining the significance of the amendment to section
1 o (a), the Conference Committee of the House and Senate• reported that the
word "exclusive" had. been omitted ". • • because of [ the Act's] provisions
authorizing temporary injunctions enjoining alleged unfair labor practices, and
••• making unions suable." 7 Neither does it appear that those sections granting jurisdiction in particular circumstances were intended to have any broader
significance. In introducing the amendment which was incorporated into the
final bill as sections 10(j) and 10(1), Senator Morse said: "My proposal
would in no way impair the legitimate rights of labor under the NorrisLaGuardia Act and the Clayton Act, since I do not propose that employers be
allowed to obtain injunctions against labor••••" 8 This was affirmed by the
Senate committee report which stated that the board may seek such temporary
injunctive relief " •.• acting in the public interest and not in vindication of
2

Textile Workers Union v. Amazon Cotton Mill Co., (D.C. N.C. 1948) 76
F. Supp. 159 at 165.
8
The pertinent part of the section states: "This power [ of the N .L.R.B. to
prevent urifair practices as defined by the act] shall not be affected by any other means
of adjustment or prevention ••• established by agreement, law, or otherwise."
4
49 Stat. L. 449-457 (1935), 29 U.S.C. (1946) §§ 15I-I66.
5
Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 at
269, 60 S.Ct. 561 (1940); United Brick & Clay Workers v. Robinson Clay Products
Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1946) 158 F. (2d) 552.
6
These se~tions are:§§ 1o(j) and 10(1) (jurisdiction to grant temporary injunctions against unfair practices upon petition by the board) ; § 303 (b) ( to award damages for certain unfair practices by unions); § 208 (to enjoin strikes or lockouts in
national emergencies when sought by the attorney general); and § 301 (a) (to enforce
collective bargaining agreements; see, 57 YALE L.J. 630 ( 1948); Cox, "Some Aspects
of the L.M.R.A., 1947," 61 HARV. L. REv. 274 at 303 (1948).
7
H. Rep. 510 on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 52 (June 3, 1947).
8
93 CoNG. REc. 1912 (March 10, 1947). The Conference Committee adopted
this version over that proposed by the House which provided for injunctions at the
request of private persons, rather than by the Board. H. Rep. 510 on H.R. 3020,
80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 57 (June 3, 1947).
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purely private rights.
." 9 After expressions of apprehension that the addition of section 303 (b) might give rise to granting injunctive relief to private
suitors in cases of jurisdictional strikes and boycotts, its author, Senator Taft,
replied that " ••• this is not the intention of the author of the amendment," and
that he did not believe " ••• any court would construe the amendment along
the lines suggested.•••" 10 To the contention of the trial judge that section
301 (b) confers such general jurisdiction on the federal courts, the appellate court
replied that the purpose of this section was simply to make clear the capacity
of unions as parties to suits. Such a provision was necessary to effectuate section
301 (a) making unions liable for breach of contract.11 Furthermore, if section
IO (a) and section 30 I (b) had the effect which the court below ascribed to
them, the other sections of the L.M.R.A. conferring on the federal courts
jurisdiction over unfair practices under specific circumstances would have been
unnecessary. Administration of the act would become chaotic if more than
two hundred federal district courts were clothed with jurisdiction concurrent
with that of the board, and the policy of placing responsibility for this administration in the hands of an expert body would be repudiated.12 In addition, such
an interpretation would virtually repeal the Norris-LaGuardia Act 13 by allowing injunctions against unfair union practices at the suit of individual employers.
It is unlikely that Congress would have taken so significant a step without
stating its intentions expressly. The position of the trial court would create a
further paradox by making futile the provisions of section 9(f), (g), and (h)
requiring the filing of financial statements and other information by unions and
affidavits of non-Communist affiliation by their officers, before the board can
investigate complaints of unfair practices made by such unions. By direct
petition to the federal district court, a union could circumvent these requirements. It is not suggested, of course, that the federal courts could not assert
jurio;diction in the case of excesses by the board or. in other unusual circumstances, or in diversity of citizenship cases to enforce rights under state law.
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S. Rep. No. 105 on S. 1I26, 80th Cong., JSt sess., p. 8 (April 17, 1947).
93 CoNG. REc. 5074 (May 9, 1947). This prophesy has been proved inaccurate by a recent decision holding that § 303 created federal rights, enforcement of
which comes within the inherent jurisdiction of equity. Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v.
Amalgamated Assn., (D.C. Ark. 1947) 74 F. Supp. 952. The Senator's intention
was followed, however, in Gerry v. I.L.G.W.U., (Superior Ct., Los Angeles County,
Cal. 1948) 48 P-H. AM. LAB. CAs. 149.
11 S. Rep. No. 105 on S. I 126, pp. 15-18 (April 17, 1947).
12 Foley, "Unfair Practices Under the Taft-Hartley Act," 33 VA. L. REv. 697,
723 (1947). See the dicta in Fitzgerald v. Douds, (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 76 F. Supp.
597·
18 47 Stat. L. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. (1946) § IOI.
9
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